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THE RETURN OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PATENT
LAW
Timothy R. Holbrook*
When discussing developments in patent law, attorneys generally
have focused on the Federal Circuit for the last two decades. Over the
last two years, however, the Federal Circuit has generally been quiet on
big issues. The Federal Circuit seems to have garnered more attention
for its failures to act than for its seminal decisions in the last few years.'
In contrast, life has been rather hectic at the Supreme Court in terms of
patent law. In the past, the Supreme Court typically addressed issues on
the periphery of patent law;2 the Court's recent cases, however, have
Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Program in Intellectual Property Law,
Chicago-Kent College of Law. My thanks to Namon Huddleston for assistance with this article.
This article is based on the talk I presented at the Eighth Annual Sughrue Symposium at the
University of Akron School of Law. My talk was entitled The Return of the Supreme Court to
Patent Law: 2005 in Review and 2006 in Preview, in which I reviewed the previous year's patent
law development. This paper focuses exclusively on recent Supreme Court patent jurisprudence.
My thanks to the organizers of that conference for the opportunity to return to Northeastern Ohio,
where I was born, raised, and learned to debate using the University of Akron for research, and to
discuss the issues contained in this paper. © 2006 Timothy R. Holbrook.
1. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 05-1157, 2006 WL 3378475,
at * I (Fed. Cir. Nov. 22, 2006) (declining reconsideration of de novo standard of review over claim
construction over numerous dissents); Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d
1373, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (declining en banc consideration of Federal Circuit's criticized written
description jurisdiction, over numerous dissents); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (reaffirming previous claim construction methodology of Vitronics Corp.
v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and not addressing numerous questions
presented in en bane order).
2. The Supreme Court has reviewed a number of Federal Circuit patent cases, but those
cases rarely involve substantive patent law. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (Federal Circuit's jurisdiction); Nelson v. Adams USA,
Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000) (procedure); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800
(1988) (Federal Circuit's jurisdiction); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (state sovereign immunity); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (intersection of utility patents and plant patents); Dickinson
v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (requiring Federal Circuit to apply APA standards of review to PTO
determinations). See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court's Complicity in Federal Circuit
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH. L. J. 1, 6 n.30 (2003) [hereinafter
1
Holbrook: Return of the Supreme Court
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
jumped into its heart.3 This activity demonstrates a renewed interest in
patent law by the Court and perhaps an increasing skepticism of the
Federal Circuit's ability to be the sole arbiter of patent law. I will
address the recent Supreme Court patent-related cases, their impact on
the patent system, and the evolving institutional dynamic between the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.
I. DECIDED SUPREME COURT CASES FROM 2005-07
The diverse set of patent-related cases decided by the Supreme
Court has demonstrated that the Court is not only concerned with narrow
issues that generally fall within the penumbra of constitutional issues.
Instead, the recent set of cases selected for certiorari primarily related to
the core aspects of patent law. During this unsettled period in patent
law, with calls for reform coming from commentators and Congress
itself, the Court is beginning to articulate its viewpoints on the
appropriate scope of protection afforded by patents. The following
section discusses the most recent cases before the Court that either are
patent cases or that have potential consequences for patent law.
Moreover, I also discuss one case that the Supreme Court dismissed as
having granted certiorari improvidently, given the lively and insightful
dissents to that dismissal.
A. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I., Ltd 4
In Merck, the Supreme Court addressed the safe harbor provision
afforded by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). This section affords a defense for
otherwise infringing acts when those acts are used to prepare a filing
before the FDA. Specifically, § 271(e)(1) states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention... solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
Holbrook, Supreme Court]; John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court
to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SuP. CT. REv. 273, 296-98 (2002).
3. Aside from the cases discussed in this article, the Supreme Court delineated key patent
law doctrine in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002)
(prosecution history estoppel), Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998) (on-sale bar to
patentability); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997)
(doctrine of equivalents, prosecution history estoppel, and the all elements rule).
4. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
2
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manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 5
This section was adopted as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act to
provide a balance between the patent owner's exclusive rights and the
interest of generic companies getting to market quickly. Before the
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Federal Circuit held in Roche
Products that use of a patented invention for the purpose of preparing an
application to a regulatory agency seeking approval of a generic version
of a drug was an act of infringement. 6  This holding meant that a
patentee would effectively get a patent term extension: generic
companies could only begin preparing for the regulatory process after
the patent expired, creating a lag between the expiration of the patent
and when the generic company could enter the market.
7
Congress responded to this situation by overruling Roche with the
statutory safe-harbor provision of § 271(e)(1). Although this safe-harbor
negatively impacted patent holders, Congress acted even-handedly by
affording patent term extensions to patent owners due to regulatory
delays in getting a product approved. It also provided a new, technical
form of infringement: the mere filing of a generic drug application
during the term of the underlying patent is now an act of infringement.
The patentee, therefore, need not wait for the generic company to enter
the market but instead can sue once the application has been filed.8
In Merck, Integra's patented invention related to a peptide that can
be used to inhibit the growth of blood vessels, providing a potential way
to combat cancer by starving cancerous tumors. Merck had tested the
5. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). For an elucidating discussion of this provision, see generally
Bradley Scott Eidson, How Safe Is The Harbor? Considering The Economic Implications Of Patent
Infringement In Section 271(e)(1) Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1169, 1171-75 (2004).
6. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded
by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat 1585, as recognized in W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
7. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 141 (2006)
[hereinafter Holbrook, Possession].
8. This specialized area of patent law has numerous complications, such as obligations for
patent owners to list the patents that cover the inventions approved by the regulatory agency
(generally the Food and Drug Administration) on what is known as the "Orange Book." This listing
obligation has generated its issues of administrative law regarding the obligations of the FDA to
monitor the accuracy of Orange Book listings. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335,
1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2003); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 238-40 (4th Cir. 2002)
(finding no obligation on part of FDA to monitor listings). Generic companies must also notify the
patent holder if they will argue before the FDA that approval should be permitted because the
generic company believes its product does not infringe the relevant patents or that the patents are
invalid or unenforceable. This certification is known as a paragraph IV certification. See generally
Holbrook, Possession, supra note 7, at 141-42.
2007]
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patented compound as a potential drug candidate but did not select it for
further drug development or an application to the FDA. Integra sued
Merck for infringement based on Merck's use of the patented peptide.
Merck contended that even though it never filed an application for
federal approval of patented peptide, its activities should fall within the
safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1), thereby immunizing them from
infringement liability. Integra countered that Merck's use was too
attenuated from the FDA approval process to qualify for such protection,
an argument that met with favor at the Federal Circuit. 9 The Federal
Circuit concluded that Merck was merely looking for new drugs that
may or may not subsequently be the subject of an FDA application."° As
such, the research was not "'reasonably related to the development and
submission of information' to the FDA."" In essence, the Federal
Circuit viewed the research as too remote from the actual application
process to qualify for the statutory defense.
The Supreme Court disagreed and gave a broader interpretation to
the statute. The Court reasoned that:
It does not follow from this, however, that § 271(e)(1)'s exemption
from infringement categorically excludes either (1) experimentation on
drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission or (2)
use of patented compounds in experiments that are not ultimately
submitted to the FDA. Under certain conditions, we think the
exemption is sufficiently broad to protect the use of patented
compounds in both situations.
12
Thus, experiments on patented drugs that, although initially promising,
are ultimately not submitted to the FDA for approval are also exempt
from infringement.
The exact contours of the Supreme Court's more expansive reading
of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor remain to be seen. The Court recognized
that there are limits as to the scope of the safe harbor but failed to
articulate exactly where any lines should be drawn. It simply concluded
that, here, the Federal Circuit had drawn the line in the wrong place and
that Merck clearly fell within the safe harbor defense. As such, the exact
contours of the defense remain unclear.
Moreover, the opinion leaves many questions unanswered that will
9. See Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(finding safe harbor inapplicable), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
10. Id. at 866.
11. Id. at 867 (quoting 35 USC § 271(e)(1) (2000)).
12. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I., Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206 (2005).
4
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need to be examined by the lower courts. For example, if the lower
courts interpret Merck broadly, then the value of research tool patents
may be greatly reduced. The Supreme Court recognized this possibility,
but left the question open.13 But, given the Court's broader view of what
constitutes qualifying activity under the safe harbor, it appears that at
least some research tool patents will be difficult to enforce. Expansion
of the statutory safe harbor defense may be appropriate in promoting the
creation and dissemination of information, particularly in light of the
Federal Circuit's evisceration of the common law "experimental use"
defense. 14
B. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd 1
5
Although not technically a patent case, the Supreme Court's MGM
Studios decision could have significant repercussions for US patent law.
The decision addressed the legality of peer-to-peer file sharing software
that did not contain a centralized index of files or copyrighted songs.
Everyone believed the Court would clarify the standard articulated in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,' 6 which insulates
technology with the capacity for substantial non-infringing uses from
contributory copyright infringement. Instead, the Court articulated a
new, active inducement theory of copyright infringement. To the
surprise of many - and consternation of some - the Court imported 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) active inducement from patent law into copyright law 17
just as it had imported 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) contributory infringement in
Sony.
In so doing, the Court avoided addressing the language in Sony that
precluded contributory copyright infringement for devices that are
"capable of substantial noninfringing uses."' 8 This judicial-sidestepping
has interesting implications for active inducement law, now both in
patent and copyright law. Particularly, the Supreme Court's concern
with the seemingly nefarious intent of Grokster highlights the important
yet uncertain role of intent in assessing infringement under § 271 (b).
13. Id. at 205 n.7 ("We therefore need not - and do not - express a view about whether, or
to what extent, §271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of 'research tools' in the development
of information for the regulatory process.").
14. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
15. 545 U.S. 913; 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
16. 464 U.S. 417, 439-42 (1984).
17. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005) ("For the same
reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-
harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it here..
18. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
20071
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The requisite intent for active inducement is an unsettled question
at the Federal Circuit. At present, Federal Circuit law is split on whether
there must be an intent to induce infringement or merely the intent to
induce the acts that constitute infringement. 9 The Federal Circuit has
generally refused to resolve the split, noting that the issue has not been
properly presented in order to resolve the difference.
There is a significant potential difference between these two
standards. If the intent required for active inducement is merely an
intent to induce the acts that constitute infringement, then the subjective
belief of the inducer regarding whether those acts are infringing or
whether the relevant patent is invalid or unenforceable are irrelevant.2°
If the intent is to induce infringement, then a good faith belief that those
acts are non-infringing or that the patent is invalid or unenforceable
would be directly relevant: such a good faith belief would negate the
intent element.2
The evolution of this area of the law no longer rests solely with the
Federal Circuit. Because the standard will now be used in copyright
cases, the regional circuits will play a role in ascertaining what the
appropriate intent should be. Indeed, it may create a circuit split that the
Supreme Court will need to resolve in the future, unless the regional
circuits simply defer to Federal Circuit law. Given the unsettled nature
of the Federal Circuit's law, however, such resort may be useless,
forcing the regional circuits to answer the question on their own. Indeed
courts in copyright cases have not referenced the Federal Circuit's active
inducement standard. In contrast, the Federal Circuit has relied upon the
Supreme Court's Grokster decision in the context of an active
inducement case under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), although the court again
avoided addressing the present intracircuit split, on an arguably
19. See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted on other grounds, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., No. 05-130, 2005 WL 3144112 (U.S.
Nov 28, 2005); MEMC Elec. Mat'ls, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Mat'ls Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2004). See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement,
22 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399 (2006) [hereinafter Holbrook, Intent]; Mark A.
Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 UC DAVIS L. REv. 225,238-39 (2005).
20. Holbrook, Intent, supra note 19, at 404-06.
21. Id. I support the "intent to induce infringement standard," but also posit that it should be a
defense for past infringement only. Once a court has adjudicated the acts of infringement and
validity of the patents, the good faith belief will be confirmed (and there is no liability anyway) or
rejected (such that from that point forward there is no longer a good faith belief). As such, the
intent would act as a bar to damages only and not prospective relief such as a permanent injunction.
See id. at 406.
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inappropriate basis. 22
In MEMC, the Federal Circuit reasoned that it need not resolve the
intracircuit split because "it is undisputed that SUMCO had knowledge
of the '302 patent. Thus, assuming that MEMC is able to demonstrate
that SUMCO had intent to induce the specific acts constituting
infringement, intent additionally to cause an infringement can be
presumed., 23 This reasoning is simply wrong: if SUMCO had a good
faith belief that the relevant patent claims were invalid, unenforceable,
or not infringed, then there would not be inducement under the "intent to
induce infringement" standard. Knowledge alone is therefore
insufficient to presume intent to induce infringement. This case squarely
presented the issue but the Federal Circuit refused to answer it. As
such, the law still lingers in uncertainty.
C. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift Eckrich, Inc. 24
Although technically an appeal from a patent case, the issue
addressed by the Supreme Court is strictly one of civil procedure. The
Court's selection of this case is somewhat surprising because the Federal
Circuit was merely applying Tenth Circuit law.25 The Federal Circuit,
when applying its own law, actually followed the approach eventually
articulated by the Supreme Court.26  Arguably, therefore, it was
inappropriate for the Supreme Court to grant review of this issue of 10th
Circuit law in a Federal Circuit case.
The issue presented was "[w]hether, and to what extent, a court of
appeals may review the sufficiency of evidence supporting a civil jury
verdict where the party made a motion for judgment as a matter of law
under Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before
submission of the case to the jury, but neither renewed that motion under
Rule 50(b) after the jury's verdict, nor moved for a new trial under Rule
59?9
' 27
The Court concluded that failure to renew the motion or move for a
new trial precludes an appellate court from reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 28 This case establishes a
22. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., 420 F.3d at 1379-80.
23. Id. at 1378 n.4.
24. 126 S.Ct. 980 (2006).
25. Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1365 n.7 (Fed. Cir.
2004), reversed by Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
26. Unitherm, 375 F.3d at 1365 n.7.
27. Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 543 U.S. 1186 (2005).
28. Unitherm, 126 S.Ct. at 989.
2007]
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national standard for appellate review of jury verdicts, but there is
nothing about it that makes it unique to patent law. The Court simply
used this case as the vehicle to change the Tenth Circuit's practice.
D. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. 29
The issue presented in Independent Ink was whether the possession
of a patent creates a presumption of market power when analyzing a
tying arrangement under antitrust law. Supreme Court precedent
previously had established such a presumption, although the continued
viability of that presumption has been called into question, even by the
Federal Circuit in this case.3°
The Supreme Court took the Federal Circuit's invitation and
rejected the presumption of market power in these cases.31  After
recounting the history of the presumption, the Court looked to
Congress's rejection of a presumption of market power in the context of
a patent misuse defense. Congress amended the Patent Act in 1988 to
require proof of market power if a defendant is arguing patent misuse as
a defense to patent infringement.32 While the Court acknowledged that
the amendment technically did not alter the Court's antitrust
jurisprudence, the Justices did recognize that the amendment "certainly
invites a reappraisal of the per se rule announced in International Salt."
33
The Court reasoned that:
It would be absurd to assume that Congress intended to provide that
the use of a patent that merited punishment as a felony would not
constitute "misuse." Moreover, given the fact that the patent misuse
doctrine provided the basis for the market power presumption, it would
29. 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006).
30. The Federal Circuit panel signaled the Supreme Court that review of this case may be
appropriate:
Even where a Supreme Court precedent contains many "infirmities" and rests upon
"wobbly, moth-eaten foundations," it remains the "Court's prerogative alone to overrule
one of its precedents." State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d
199 (1997). None of the authorities that defendants present... constituted an express
overruling of International Salt or Loew's. We conclude that the Supreme Court has held
that there is a presumption of market power in patent tying cases, and we are obliged to
follow the Supreme Court's direction in this respect. The time may have come to
abandon the doctrine, but it is up to the Congress or the Supreme Court to make this
judgment.
Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated
and reversed by Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. 126 S.Ct. 1281 (2006).
31. Independent Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1284.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5).
33. Illinois Tool Wooks, 126 S.Ct. at 1290-91.
8
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be anomalous to preserve the presumption in antitrust after Congress
has eliminated its foundation.
34
Overturning its prior decisions, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected
the presumption of market power and now requires proof of market
power in the market for the patented good.35 Such an outcome was
expected, and is consistent with generally accepted views in both the
antitrust and patent communities.
E. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L. C, 36
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to review the
Federal Circuit's standard 37 for granting permanent injunctions in patent
infringement cases. The Federal Circuit had stated that permanent
injunctions would be granted in patent infringement cases unless there
were exceptional circumstances, such as an interest in protecting the
public health.38 In effect, the Federal Circuit categorically required
permanent injunctions in every patent case where the court had found
infringement of a valid patent claim.
The Patent Act permissibly authorizes courts to grant permanent
injunctions "in accordance with the principles of equity," 39 seemingly
requiring a balancing of equitable factors that the Federal Circuit did not
do. The Federal Circuit in this case specifically reversed the district
court's denial of permanent injunction, noting that this case did not
present such exceptional circumstances.40
The Supreme Court not only granted certiorari on the issue
presented by the petitioner,4' but also articulated a second question to
address:
Whether this Court should reconsider its precedents, including
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S.
34. Id. at 1291.
35. Id. at 1293 ("Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most economists have all
reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily confer market power upon the patentee.
Today, we reach the same conclusion, and therefore hold that, in all cases involving a tying
arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying product.").
36. 126 S.Ct. 733 (2005).
37. Id.
38. MercExchange, 401 F.3dat 1338.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
40. MercExchange, 401 F.3dat 1339.
41. The petitioner's question presented is "[w]hether the Federal Circuit erred in setting forth
a general rule in patent cases that a district court must, absent exceptional circumstances, issue a
permanent injunction after a finding of infringement." Petition for Writ of Certiorari, eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., No. 05-130, 2005 WL 1801263 (July 25, 2005).
2007]
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405 (1908), on when it is appropriate to grant an injunction
against a patent infringer.42
In Continental Paper Bag, the Supreme Court held that the failure of the
patentee to practice the invention was not by itself a sufficient basis to
deny a permanent injunction.43 Presentation of this questions suggested
that the Court was aware of the "patent troll" phenomenon, where a
patent holder does not manufacture any goods but instead seeks licenses
under the patents.
The Supreme Court ultimately declined to overturn Continental
Paper Bag and concluded that both the Federal Circuit and the district
court erred in their respective analysis. 44 The Court reasoned that
injunctive relief is available in patent cases under the same
circumstances as in non-patent cases,45 only after equitable balancing of
four factors:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
• - 46
disserved by a permanent injunction.
The Court acknowledged that the district court did use the appropriate
four factor test, but erred in applying those factors. The Court criticized
the court for "adopt[ing] certain expansive principles suggesting that
injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases." Particularly,
the Supreme Court rejected the district court's reliance on the patent
holders "willingness to license its patents" and failure to practice the
patent as sufficient to conclude there would be no irreparable harm.47
The Court reasoned that equity does not allow a court to paint with such
a broad brush because some patent holders, such as solo-inventors and
universities, may not have the ability to practice the invention at a
42. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005).
43. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). The
patentee was using an older method, so the patentee in this case at least was providing something to
the public.
44. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
45. Id. at 1839 ("These familiar principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the
Patent Act. As this Court has long recognized, 'a major departure from the long tradition of equity
practice should not be lightly implied.' Nothing in the Patent Act indicates that Congress intended
such a departure. To the contrary, the Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions 'may' issue "in
accordance with the principles of equity."').
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1840.
10
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commercial level.48 In those circumstances, a permanent injunction may
be appropriate. The Court then confirmed the continuing vitality of
Continental Paper Bag:
To the extent that the District Court adopted such a categorical rule,
then, its analysis cannot be squared with the principles of equity
adopted by Congress. The court's categorical rule is also in tension
with Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S.
405, 422-430 (1908), which rejected the contention that a court of
equity has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to a patent holder
who has unreasonably declined to use the patent.
49
The Court did not conclude, however, that the Federal Circuit's
approach was correct. Instead, the Federal Circuit had gone too far to
the other extreme by denying permanent injunctions only in exceptional
circumstances. The Court rejected this categorical approach in favor of
permanent injunctions, requiring the Federal Circuit to apply the basic
four-factor framework. °
While this outcome alone would be of incredible significance, the
truly fascinating aspect of the Court's decision is the diametrically
opposed concurrences. These opinions show that the Court is fractured
on what the impact of Court's unanimous opinion will have in practice.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg,
emphasized that, historically, the granting of permanent injunctions has
always been the norm and that denial of an injunction is in fact rare."
The lower courts, therefore, do not write on a clean slate and should take
this history into account when balancing the four equitable factors:
"When it comes to discerning and applying those standards, in this area
as others, 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic.'
52
In contrast, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer, interpreted the Court's decision to portend a departure from
the traditional practice, particularly because times have changed:
In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many
instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic
function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier
53cases.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1840-41.
50. eBay Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1841.
51. Id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
52. Id. at 1842 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
53. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy identified a number of modem scenarios that may
suggest that a permanent injunction is not appropriate: where the patent
holder's business model is to seek licenses without producing anything
himself (i.e. where the patent holder is a "patent troll"); where the
infringement is only of a component of a larger product; or where the
invention is on a business method, patents which may be vague or of
suspect validity. 4 Thus, while history can be an aid, "district courts
must determine whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases
before them.,
55
As the Court's opinion is less than a year old, drawing conclusions
on what changes, if any, will occur in the practice of granting permanent
injunctions is difficult to discern. Tellingly though, three district courts
have already refused to grant a permanent injunction in light of the
Supreme Court's eBay decision. 6 Thus, at least some district courts
seem to be siding with Justice Kennedy's view of permanent
injunctions.5 7 Whether the Federal Circuit will allow these denials to
stand, and whether that court will bring injunctive relief effectively back
to pre-eBay levels, remains to be seen.
F. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories,
Inc. 58
In Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite Laboratories, the Court agreed
to review the validity of a patented method that related to a correlation
between a vitamin deficiency and a level of proteins in a patient's blood.
Specifically, the claim at issue was to:
A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-
blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an
elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level
54. Id. It is not clear to me how consideration of the nature of the invention - a business
method - would factor in appropriately at the permanent injunction stage. The court necessarily has
found the claims at issue valid and definite. Minimally, this statement by Justice Kennedy suggests
he doubts that business methods are proper subject matter for a patent.
55. Id. at 1842-43.
56. Voda v. Cordiss Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, 5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5,
2006); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at 6 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 16, 2006); z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F.Supp.2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex.
2006).
57. Two of the cases, Paice and z4 both involved patents on components of larger devices, a
concern expressly addressed in Justice Kennedy's concurrence. z4 Technologies, 434 F.Supp.2d at
441 (citing eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); Paice LLC, 2006 WL 2385139, at
6.
58. 370 F.3d 1354 (2004), cert. dismissed, 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006).
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of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin
or folate.
59
The claim was not limited to a particular method of performing this
correlation, unlike the other claims in the patent. The Federal Circuit
noted that a doctor receiving the results of the assay would infringe
merely by recognizing the correlation.6 °
The procedural history of this case, and the ultimate dismissal of
the case by the Court, makes the lack of an outcome particularly
unsatisfying. The Supreme Court apparently went out of its way to grab
this decision, only to dismiss the case at the eleventh hour. Specifically,
the Court asked the Solicitor General to address the following question:
The method consists of the following: First, measure the level of
the relevant amino acids using any device, whether the device is,
or is not, patented; second, notice whether the amino acid level
is elevated and, if so, conclude that a vitamin B deficiency
exists. Is the patent invalid because one cannot patent "laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas"? Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155
(1981).61
This request was somewhat surprising because the accused infringer did
not challenge the validity of the claim on this basis. The issue arguably
was inherently present in the third question in the certiorari petition:
Whether a method patent setting forth an indefinite,
undescribed, and non-enabling step directing a party simply to
"correlat[e]" test results can validly claim a monopoly over a
basic scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that
any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking
59. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658, col. 11, II. 58-65 (issued Jul. 10, 1990), invalidated,
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 543 (2005).
60. Metabolite Laboratories., Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The record shows that physicians order assays and correlate the results of those
assays, thereby directly infringing. LabCorp's Discipline Director, Dr. Peter Wentz, testified that
the physicians receiving total homocysteine assays from LabCorp carry out the correlating step.").
The Supreme Court dissenters also recognized this reality:
[T]he inventors testified that claim 13's "correlating" step consists simply of a
physician's recognizing that a test that shows an elevated homocysteine level-by that
very fact-shows the patient likely has a cobalamin or folate deficiency. They added
that, because the natural relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency was
now well known, such "correlating" would occur automatically in the mind of any
competent physician.
Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921, 2924 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal) (citations omitted).
61. 125 S.Ct. 1413, 1413-14 (2005).
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about the relationship after looking at a test result. 62
The Solicitor General recommended that the Court not take the case,
although it did recognize that there may be an issue with the
patentability of the claimed correlation. 63 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
granted certorari only on this third question and not with respect to the
question it posed to the Solicitor General. 64
After briefing and argument, the Court ultimately concluded that
the issue was not properly before it, dismissing the case as certiorari
being improvidently granted. 65  The dismissal came with a stinging,
insightful dissent by Justice Breyer, with whom Stevens and Souter
joined.
These Justices believed that the question was properly before the
Court6 6 and additionally that claim 13 should be invalidated as merely
claiming a natural phenomenon.67 According to the Justices, the
correlation between the elevated protein level necessarily, as a matter of
nature, corresponds to a vitamin B deficiency:
At most, respondents have simply described the natural law at issue in
the abstract patent language of a "process." But they cannot avoid the
fact that the process is no more than an instruction to read some
numbers in light of medical knowledge.
68
The dissenters rejected the patentee's reliance on other Supreme Court
cases, considering those cases inapposite because those cases relied on
the transformation of blood or another material; instead the claim simply
requires "the user to (1) obtain test results and (2) think about them., 69
The dissent also viewed the patentee's reliance on the Federal
Circuit's decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.,70 as unavailing.71 In State Street, the Federal
62. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories. at i No. 04-607 (2004); 2004 WL 2505526.
63. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, No. 04-607, 2005 WL 2072283 at 6-7 (Aug 26, 2005).
64. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,126 S.Ct. 601 (2005).
65. Laboratory Corp., 126 S.Ct. at 2921.
66. Id. at 2925-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2928 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2928 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Bryer does not view the case as even a
close one, noting that it is "not at the boundary" and the claim "is invalid no matter how narrowly
one reasonably interprets [natural phenomenon] doctrine." Id. at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70. 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
71. Metabolite, 126 S.Ct. at 2928 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Circuit confirmed the patentability of methods of doing business.72 In
reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit held that an invention is
eligible for patent protection if it produces a "a useful, concrete and
tangible result., 73  The dissent in Metabolite disagreed with this
assessment of the law. Bringing the viability of State Street into
question, the dissent noted that "this Court has never made such a
statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances
where this Court has held the contrary. 74
The dissenting opinion offered considerable insight into the
Justices' view of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit. Taking note of the recent debate over the patent system,
the Justices noted that
In either event, a decision from this generalist Court could contribute
to the important ongoing debate, among both specialists and
generalists, as to whether the patent system, as currently administered
and enforced, adequately reflects the "careful balance" that "the federal
patent laws ... embod[y]." 75
This reasoning may explain to some degree the Supreme Court's recent
interest and considerable involvement in patent law.
Although the Court dismissed the case, the issue of subject matter
eligibility now is of primary concern for the patent system. Three
Justices clearly believe that patents on correlations such as the one in
claim 13 are simply natural phenomena, which would render the claim
ineligible for patent protection.76 As such, the court system may yet deal
with this issue in a case where it is expressly presented.
Moreover, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), taking the
signal from the Supreme Court, has issued new guidelines for assessing
subject matter eligibility. 77 These new guidelines may obviate the need
for additional judicial consideration of the issue of the PTO alters its
methodology to address the concerns of the dissenters in Metabolite. The
guidelines do note that examiners should assess whether the claimed
72. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373.
73. Id.
74. Metabolite, 126 S.Ct. at 2928 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2929 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141,146 (1989)).
76. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("Excluded from such patent protection are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.").
77. See Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility, 1300 OFF. GAz. PAT. OFFICE 142 (November 15, 2005).
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invention covers a law of nature, natural phenomena or abstract idea.78
Of course, this change at the PTO would not address the voluminous
number of patents that have already issued on correlations and other
natural phenomena. If the courts or the PTO ultimately agrees with the
dissenters, many patent claims, particularly those that relate to genes that
predispose someone to a given disease, could be in jeopardy.79 Often,
these patents are phrased as a correlation between the existence of a
mutation and an increased likelihood of developing a certain disease,
such as cancer. The correlation would seemingly be a natural result of
the presence of the mutation, much as the correlation in Metabolite
existed as a matter of natural fact. Consequently, a host of patents on
genes and mutations may be invalidated if the viewpoint of the dissent in
Metabolite is embraced.
Minimally, the issue of eligible subject matter has been pushed to
the forefront of patent law, even with the dismissal of the Metabolite
case. The dissent offers considerable insight into how the case may have
gone and should provide guidance to the courts, PTO, and possibly
policy makers in how to address the scope of patent eligibility.
G. Medlmmune v. Genentech 80
In MedImmune, the Supreme Court addressed whether a patent
licensee must material breach the license in order to have standing to
bring a declaratory judgment action for invalidity or non-infringement.
The specific question presented was whether
Article III's grant of jurisdiction of "all Cases... arising under.., the
Laws of the United States," implemented in the "actual controversy"
requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a),
require a patent licensee to refuse to pay royalties and commit material
breach of the license agreement before suing to declare the patent
invalid, unenforceable or not infringed?
81
MedlImmune took a license from Genentech that covered one patent and
78. Id.
79. See Jordan Paradise, Lori Andrew, Tim Holbrook, & Danielle Bochneak, When Patents
Threaten Science, 314 SCIENCE 1395, 1395 (Dec. 1, 2006); Jordan Paradise, Lori Andrews, and Tim
Holbrook, Patents on Human Genes: An Analysis of Scope and Claims, 307 SCIENCE 1566, 1566
(2005) (discussing claims on methods of correlating gene mutations with predispositions to certain
conditions).
80. 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007).
81. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 05-608, 2005
WL 3067195, at i (Nov. 10, 2005).
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would then cover a pending application.8 2  When the second patent
issued, Genentech advised MedImmune that its product Synagis® was
covered by the second patent and therefore royalties were due.
83
MedImmune disagreed but feared treble damages, attorney's fees, and
injunctive relief preventing sale of Synagis, which accounted for greater
than 80% of their revenue.84 MedImmune paid and continued to pay the
royalties arguably due under the license, but nevertheless filed a
declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that the patent was
not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable. 5
The Federal Circuit concluded that there was no Article III case or
controversy and thus no jurisdiction. 6 The Federal Circuit reasoned
that, absent a breach, the licensee cannot have a reasonable apprehension
of suit.8 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the judgment
of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case.
As a preliminary matter, the Court clarified that the case involves a
contract dispute and not merely an issue of patent validity. Although
likely irrelevant to the Court's ultimate determination regarding
jurisdiction, 8 the Court made clear that the petitioner "has raised and
preserved a contract claim."89
Turning to the question of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
concluded that the "case or controversy" requirement was satisfied in
this case. The Court recognized that it has not "draw[n] the brightest of
lines between those declaratory-judgment actions that satisfy the case-
or-controversy requirement and those that do not."90  Providing little
guidance, the Court simply noted that the jurisdictional inquiry rests on
"'whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there
is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment."' 91 The Court recognized that, had there been a
breach, then there would have been a case or controversy.
The lack of a breach of the license, however, was not fatal to
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court acknowledged that, in cases where




86. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
87. Id.
88. Medlmmune, 127 S. Ct. at 769.
89. Id. at 770.
90. Id. at 771.
91. Id. (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
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threatened government action is the concern, the Court has permitted
declaratory judgment actions without requiring, for example, the
plaintiff to actually break the law. 92  The Court saw no difference
between government and private enforcement actions.93 The Court
found support in its decision in Altvater v. Freeman, in which "several
patentees had sued their licensees to enforce territorial restrictions in the
license." 94  The licensees continued to pay their royalties but still
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of invalidity, 95, and the
Court concluded there was a case or controversy because the royalties
were paid under protest with the threat of injunctions, damages, and
treble damages looming overhead. 96 Perhaps the most important aspect
of the Court's opinion is found in footnote 11, in which it notes that the
Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of suit" test is inconsistent
with Altvater. The Court went onto sharply criticize the test, noting that
this test conflicts with a number of Supreme Court decisions.97
The Court also rejected the respondents contention that a license
acts as an insurance policy for the patentee against suits challenging the
patents validity. The court refused to read into such agreements an
implicit "prohibition against challengeing the validity of the patents. ' 98
The Court reasoned that "[p]romising to pay royalties on patents that
have not been held invalid does not amount to a promise not to seek a
holding of their invalidity." 99 Similarly, the Court rejected application
of the common law rule that "a party to a contract cannot at one and the
same time challenge its validity and continue to reap its benefits."' 00
The Court noted that the rule would not apply here, where the petitioner
is not repudiating the license but instead challenging its scope.
Regardless, according the Court, such an argument would be one on the
merits and does not implicate the issue of jurisdiction. 101
The Court then remanded the case because, although there is a case
or controversy under Article III, the district court still has the discretion
to decline jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Because
92. Id. at 772.
93. Id.
94. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 772.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 774 n. 11. The Court chided the Federal Circuit for the tests "evolved form, the
'reasonable apprehension of imminent suit' test." Id. (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 776.
99. Id. (emphasis in original).
100. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 776.
101. Id.
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deciding that issue would be "imprudent," the court remanded to allow
the lower courts to make this determination. °2
The potential ramifications from this case are uncertain, but they
stand to be profound. At a minimum, this case will have ramifications
outside of the patent context because it bears on declaratory judgment
action, even in non-intellectual property cases. Most importantly,
however, the Supreme Court provided very little guidance as to when
there would not be jurisdiction in these cases. The Court simply said
there was a case or controversy here, but failed to articulate a standard
for the lower courts to apply.
In addition to failing to articulate a standard, the Court may have
eviscerated the Federal Circuit's rule. Footnote 11 offers a harsh
criticism of the "reasonable apprehension of suit" test, calling the
continued viability of that standard into question. It would premature,
however, to declare the Federal Circuit's test dead. The Supreme Court
criticized the standard only when it resulted in a conclusion of no
jurisdiction; the Court did not say that the test is not an appropriate tool
for finding a case or controversy. In other words, a showing of a
reasonable apprehension of suit would be sufficient to find that there is
an actual case or controversy, but it is not necessary. A party may show
a case or controversy through some other approach. Thus, the
"reasonable apprehension of suit" test may yet be alive as a way of
showing there is a case or controversy. Failure to show a reasonable
apprehension does not mean, however, that there is not a case or
controversy. Parties may use other approaches to make that assessment.
The Federal Circuit's test therefore may have some applicability but it
will no longer be the sole test for assessing jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
The Supreme Court's decision also leaves unanswered what steps a
patent holder can take in crafting its license to discourage the licensee
from challenging the validity of the patent. A blanket prohibition on
challenging a patent's validity likely would be unenforceable under Lear
v. Adkins, which eliminated the doctrine of licensee estoppel. 10 3 Such a
contractual prohibition would be a transparent attempt to end run this
holding and likely would not be enforceable. But other options remain
available to patentees to discourage challenges to the license absent a
breach. For example, the license could call for an enhanced royalty if
102. Id. at 777. Justice Thomas dissented from the majority opinion, both on the ground that
there is no contract dispute and that there is no case or controversy. See id. at 777-82 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
103. 395 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1969).
2007]
19
Holbrook: Return of the Supreme Court
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
the licensee brings a declaratory judgment suit. In order to be in
compliance with the license, the licensee would have to pay, for
example, treble the royalty rate. Other punitive measures could be
included in the license to discourage such challenges. Whether these
measures will withstand the one-two punch of Lear and MedImmune,
however, remains an open question and one that undoubtedly will be the
subject of future litigation.
II. PENDING SUPREME COURT CASES
In addition to the above cases, the Supreme Court is currently
considering two other patent cases. These cases are of considerable
importance to the patent system, dealing with when licensees can
challenge a patent, when an invention should be considered obvious, and
the extent of a patent's extraterritorial reach.
A.. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. 104
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court will
dive into the heart of patent law by addressing the appropriate standard
for assessing whether a claimed invention is obvious. Specifically, the
question presented in this case is:
Whether the Federal Circuit has erred in holding that a claimed
invention cannot be held "obvious", and thus unpatentable under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a), in the absence of some proven "'teaching, suggestion,
or motivation' that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art
to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed."
05
This case challenges the Federal Circuit's current requirement that there
be a motivation to combine references in order for a patent claim to be
obvious. By requiring an express motivation in the prior art,
commentators have suggested that the Federal Circuit has lowered the
bar for nonobviousness, resulting in the issuance of many patents that
should be invalid.10 6 Recent Federal Circuit cases may demonstrate that
the court has recognized this problem and is finding the motivation to
104. 119 Fed. Appx. 282 (2005), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 327 (2005).
105. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350, at
i, (2005); 2005 WL 835463.
106. See A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21'T CENTURY 89-90 (Nat'l Academies Press 2004,
Stephen A. Merrill, et. al., eds.); Holbrook, Possession, supra note 7, at 172-73 n. 276; Timothy R.
Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism In Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 123, 128 n.22 (2005) [hereinafter Holbrook, Claim Construction]; John R. Thomas,
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 773 (2003).
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combine from other sources, such as the nature of the problem and the
knowledge of one having ordinary skill in the art. 10 7  This softening of
the Federal Circuit's heretofore bright-line rule would appear to be
interesting and conspicuous lobbying by the Federal Circuit to avoid
reversal by the Supreme Court. The Court did in fact hear those pleas,
as Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg acknowledged in the oral
argument. 10 8  Other Justices also recognized this effort by the Federal
Circuit, in a less-than-flattering tone.10 9
The briefing of this case, and the options for resolving this issue
presented to the Court, have been disappointing, however. All the
parties and amici seem stuck in a bifurcated world - either the
suggestion test or its back to Graham."0 Both of those options are
terribly unsatisfying and likely unhelpful to the Supreme Court. No one
seems to be trying to find a way to reconcile the interest in certainty
expressed by the Federal Circuit (as embodied in the suggestion test)
with the interest guarding against formalistic law that results in patents
on arguably trivial advances.
The Supreme Court has recognized these concerns and the tension
therein. Markman, Warner-Jenkinson, Festo, and even Traffix are
replete with discussions along these lines."' The approach that the
Court has routinely adopted to balance these concerns can be summed
107. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987-88 (Fed.Cir.2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan
Laboratories., Inc. 464 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1322 (Fed.Cir.2005); Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v.
Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
108. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral arguments/argument-transcripts/04-1350.pdf (Justice
Ginsburg asking, "Would you make, be making the same argument if we were looking at the most
recent decisions of the Federal Circuit, the ones that they issued within the year, and each as I
remember they held that the patent was obvious and therefore invalid? Suppose we were dealing in
what was, the cases were, what were they, Kahn, Alpha, and Diestar?"); id. at 51 (The Chief Justice
noting "Well, that's because the Federal Circuit's approach focuses narrowly prior to our grant of
certiorari, allegedly more flexibly after, on prior art, as opposed to I would say common sense.");
see also id. at 36 (respondent arguing that "the Federal Circuit has made quite clear [since the grant
of certiorari] that its test is inclusive, and we think that that establishes that it's not necessary to add
some new sort of undetermined test").
109. Id. at 53 (Justice Breyer noting that "[the Federal Circuit] so quickly modified itself' and
Justice Scalia following with "And in the last year or so, after we granted cert in this case after these
decades of thinking about it, it suddenly decides to polish it up.").
110. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006 WL 2989549 (Oct.
16, 2006) (retain suggestion test); Brief for Petitioner, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006 WL
2515631 (Aug. 22, 2006) (return to Graham); Brief of United States in Support of Petitioner, KSR
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006 WL 2453601 (Aug. 22, 2006) (return to Graham); Brief of
Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006
WL 2452369 (Aug 22, 2006) (return to Graham).
111. See supra note 3.
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up in the word "presumptions.' 12 The IBM amicus brief posits the use
of a presumption based on the presence of all the claim limitations in
prior art references that constitute analogous art." 1
3
The problem with the suggestion test is not its application when
there is a suggestion to combine." 14 An extant suggestion is incredibly
strong evidence of obviousness. Similarly (and absent from the
dialogue) is the presence of a teaching away in the prior art, which is
strong evidence of non-obviousness." 5 Indeed, the two seem to be
different sides of the same coin. The problem is that the absence of a
motivation should not be fatal to a determination that the invention is
obvious. The absence of a motivation means very little, just as the
absence of a teaching away in the prior art means little to the ultimate
question of obviousness. When there is neither a motivation to combine
nor a teaching away, resorting to the basic Graham framework would
appear to be appropriate.
This situation would seem ripe for the use of presumptions, an
approach that the Court has used in the past to create some level of
certainty to ambiguous areas of the law. The presence of a suggestion to
combine should create a presumption of obviousness, rebuttable by
strong secondary considerations, such as the failure of others,
unexpected results, or long-felt but unsolved need, or by contrary
evidence from the prior art. Similarly, the presence of a teaching away
should create a presumption of non-obviousness, rebuttable by other
secondary considerations suggesting the advancement was merely trivial
or other parts of the prior art demonstrating that one of skill in the art
would not view this combination as being discouraged by the prior art.
In the absence of either a suggestion to combine or a teaching away, no
presumption arises and the court should apply the Graham methodology
alone, absent any presumptions. Indeed, the absence of either a
112. See Holbrook, Claim Construction, supra note 106, at 129-33 (recognizing Supreme
Court's preference for presumptions); Holbrook, Supreme Court, supra note 2, at 9-10.
113. Brief for International Business Machines Corp. in Support of Respondent, KSR Int'l Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc., 2006 WL 2430566, at 18 (Aug. 22, 2006). IBM argues that "references should be
presumed combinable by a person having ordinary skill in the art where the references are within
the scope of the 'analogous art'; in such circumstances, there need not be a motivation to combine
the references. Id.
114. The U.S. government recognized this dynamic at oral argument . See KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at 19 ("We agree that teaching
suggestion and motivation are valid means of proving obviousness, valid considerations for the
Court . .. The problem with the Federal Circuit's test is it makes that the exclusive test and
precludes obviousness determinations in the absence of satisfaction of that test which this Court's
precedents are clearly not consistent with.").
115. See. e.g., In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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motivation or a teaching away says very little about the state of the art
one way or the other; it is merely an absence of evidence and not
evidence of a lack of technical know-how.
Although this approach has not been advocated by parties, and the
brief by IBM articulates a version of rebuttable presumptions, hopefully
the Court will continue to apply its preferred methodology of using
presumptions to enhance certainty, and will adopt an approach
somewhat akin to that presented here.
B. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 116
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp.,1 17 which involves a complex statutory interpretation of an
extraterritorial infringement provision.118  To understand this issue
thoroughly, however, a brief review of the history of this provision is
appropriate. 119
Generally, patents are viewed as territorial rights such that the right
to exclude is limited to acts within the United States.' 20  The Supreme
Court generally interpreted this limitation rather strictly. 121 Most
recently, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Deepsouth Packing
Co. v. Laitram.122 There the accused infringer had manufactured all of
the components of the patented device but never completed the assembly
of the device; instead, the parts were exported where the machine was
routinely assembled. As a result, the invention had never been made in
its entirety in the United States. The Supreme Court strictly interpreted
the Patent Act's infringement provisions, reasoning that the invention
itself has never been made, used or sold in the United States. As such,
there was no infringement under the U.S. patent.
123
116. 414 F.3d 1366 (2005), cert granted, 127 S.Ct. 467 (2006).
117. No. 05-1056, 2006 WL 403667, at * 1 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2006).
118. Technically, this provision is not strictly extraterritorial because there is a domestic nexus
- the manufacture of parts of the invention in the United States and subsequent export. The reality
is, however, that this provision can be used by U.S. patent holders to protect its rights in foreign
markets, which is an extraterritorial effect.
119. This section is based on my draft article, Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in
Patent Law, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=944157 [hereinafter
Holbrook, Extraterritoriality].
120. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the
United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 701, 719-21 (2004) [hereinafter
Holbrook, Territoriality Waning?]; Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in
Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 604 (1997).
121. See Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra note 119, at 7.
122. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
123. Id.; But see id. at 532-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (rejecting this interpretation of
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In response to this holding, the Congress eventually overruled
Deepsouth by adopting § 271(f). The first part of § 271(f) is specifically
directed the Deepsouth scenario by defining infringement to include the
exportation of the unassembled components of the patented invention if
the exporter actively induces the assembly of the device outside of the
United States. Congress went even further, however, by adopting §
271(f)(2), which expanded infringement to include the exportation of a
component of a patented device with no substantial non-infringing
use.
12 4
In Microsoft Corp., the court addressed two questions: whether a
"component" of an invention under § 271(f) could be something
intangible like computer software and "whether software replicated
abroad from a master version exported from the United States-with the
intent that it be replicated-may be deemed 'supplied' from the United
States. 125  The Federal Circuit had already answered the former
question in the affirmative in Eolas Technolgies Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp.,126 holding that software could be a component of an invention.
As to the latter question, the court also answered that question
affirmatively, noting that "supplying" software generally requires the
making of a copy. 127  Copying is therefore subsumed in supplying
software components.12  Moreover, software exported via golden disks
or electronic transmission both fall within the scope of § 271(f)'s
proscription on supplying the components of a patented invention:
"[liability under § 271(f) is not premised on the mode of exportation,
but rather the fact of exportation."' 29 The court admittedly interpreted
the statute broadly to effectuate the legislative intent behind the
provision.' 30 The Federal Circuit, in the one-two punch of Eolas and
AT&T greatly expanded the territorial reach of U.S. patents because now




The Supreme Court has agreed to review both questions. Likely,
"make" as too narrow).
124. See Holbrook, Territoriality Waning?, supra note 120, at 721.
125. AT & T Corp., v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
126. 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
127. AT&T, 414F.3dat 1370.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1371.
130. Id.
131. Judge Rader dissented in A T&T, concluding that copying and supplying are different, with
the former not covered by § 271(f). See id. at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Rader's concerns
with extraterritoriality are a bit perplexing, however, given that he authored Eolas.
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the Court will reverse one, if not, both of the Federal Circuit's
conclusions. The Eolas question seems to be the most important,
however. Moreover, absent from the Federal Circuit's analysis is any
concern for the impact of this decision on the interests of the countries to
which the software was exported. The Federal Circuit has never applied
comity concerns, an apparently glaring absence from its case law. 132
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent intervention into patent law is
fascinating. No longer is the Court leaving the Federal Circuit to its own
devices, interceding only on issues peripheral to patent law and which
generally involves issues with which the Court is familiar. Instead, the
Court has shown a willingness over the last two years to dive into the
heart of patent law, offering its views as a generalist court on the
appropriate scope of the U.S. patent system. Such intervention perhaps
shows that the Supreme Court has given the Federal Circuit time to
mature, and now will reassert itself in the area of patent law. The Court
may also now be responding to the often splintered decisions of the
Federal Circuit, which may be likely given its expertise and may help
identify key issues appropriate for the Court to resolve.1 33 As to whether
the Supreme Court's intervention will be viewed as a constant present or
a mere passing interlude, only time will tell. This period of time,
however, will leave an indelible mark on the patent law landscape.
Interestingly, this rash of cases shows an interesting dynamic within
the Supreme Court. Nearly every patent case decided is unanimous, yet
the opinions remain rather vague and unsatisfying. Perhaps the Supreme
Court prefers unanimous decisions so as to speak with commanding
authority in this area where it is not an expert and where there is a
specialized court. Moreover, these decisions show that the Supreme
Court is not uniform in its views on all of these issues. Review of the
concurrences in these cases, such as Grokster and eBay shows
considerable disagreement at the Court with the intended impact of the
majority decisions. Thus, practitioners should take heed of the various
concurring opinions - insight into the views of the Supreme Court
justices will be best illuminated there.
132. See Extraterritoriality, supra note 119, at 38 (recognizing this omission and offering a
methodology for addressing such concerns).
133. See Duffy, supra note 2, at 284 ("[T]he expertise of the Federal Circuit judges tends to
illuminate the difficult issues of patent law, making the issues more visible, more comprehensible,
and easier to review.").
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